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Abstract
Prior studies have shown that ownership structure of firms
affects their performance, decision making and earnings. Studies have
found that institutional owners are well informed, organized and
proactive as compared to other owners.  In this study we empirically
examined the impact of institutional ownership on earnings quality
for the listed firms of the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX). The data of
200 non-financial listed firms from 2002 to 2014 is collected for this
study. The conceptual framework of Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB, 1980) is used to measure the earnings quality. The four
dimensions of earnings quality studied are: predictive value, neutrality,
timeliness and representational faithfulness. Results showed
institutional ownership is positively related with earnings quality.
Moreover, a greater level of institutional shareholding brings more
oversight and enhances earnings quality.
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Introduction
Today’s modern world technologies have converted local
businesses into global businesses. Investors are now investing their
funds around the globe to avail the benefits of overseas opportunities.
Foreign as well as local investors are interested in assessing the risks
associated with the stock markets as well as the risks specific to a
firm. Prior studies (Verdi, 2005;Krishnan and Yang, 2009;Martínez
Ferrero, Garcia Sanchez and Cuadrado Ballesteros, 2015) have shown
that the quality of earnings is relevant to investors’ investment
decisions. These studies have found quality of earnings as one of
the important risk factors. The quality of earnings is one of the
important topics of financial reporting. Funds managers, investors
and other stakeholders take keen interest in the financial reporting
and quality of earnings.It is empirically found that many of the
problems in financial reporting system are associated with deficiencies
of corporate governance (Melis,2000).
In any sort of ownership, the management is answerable to
stakeholders and each stakeholder tries to alter the results for its own
interest. With different ownership structures and management styles
the timely reforms are inevitable in corporate governance mechanisms.
Latif and Abdullah (2015) argued that good governance can curtail
the managers’ opportunistic behavior and help to reduce agency
cost. Shareholder activism and corporate governance not only provide
good decision making environment but also make managers
accountable by financial reporting (Smith and Michael, 1996).
Institutional ownership is one of the mechanisms of corporate
governance. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argued that institutional owners
are large investors and they invest and manage on behalf of other
small investors in equities and they can easily monitor the managers
as compared to individual investor.Shleifer and Vishny (1997)
discussed that large shareholding and legal protections to investors
are identical schemes of the corporate governance and large
investment can solve the agency problems effectively. Hartzell and
Starks (2003) also suggested that institutional investors are better
able and expert to curtail self-serving behavior of the managers.
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This research work endeavored to contribute to the current
literature by exploring the role of institutional ownership with respect
to the quality of earnings in the context of Pakistan. Several studies
(Butt and Shah, 2009; Kamran and Shah, 2014; Latif and Abdullah,
2015)on this topic have been conducted in Pakistan but the focus of
these studies was to find association between ownership structure
earnings management. But no study until now has focused on the
qualitative aspects of financial information.
To fill this gap we endeavored to examine the influence of
institutional ownership on the qualitative characteristics of accounting
information. Prior studies have used various proxies for the quality of
earnings such as predictability, timeliness and conservatism (Francis,
et al., 2004) information quality (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2005)
announcement lag (Krishnan and Yang, 2009) and transparency,
completeness, neutrality, accuracy, comparability (Martínez Ferrero,
Garcia Sanchez and Cuadrado Ballesteros, 2015). In this study we
have standardized our selection and examined the qualitative attributes
of earnings highlighted in Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB) Statement No. 02 (FASB, 1980). This study explores knowledge
in this area in the context of Pakistan. The results of this study would
the help managers, investors, decision makers and other stakeholders
in understanding that differences in ownership structures can influence
earnings quality of the listed firms.
Literature Review
Managers tend to have opportunistic behavior that benefits
them economically. They use judgment in structuring transactions to
alter the financial report for the purpose to either misinform the
stakeholders or to reap the benefits of contractual outcomes dependent
on firm performance. And the likelihood of this opportunistic behavior
rises where the firms have weak governance structures (Latif and
Abdullah, 2015).Alteration of financial information deteriorates the
quality of reported earnings and reduces the investors’ confidence on
the financial reports. Broadly, corporate governance refers to the rules,
laws and processes that direct the affairs of a firm. These rules, laws
and processes ensure transparency, accountability and fairness in the
relationship between a firm and all its stakeholders. Good corporate
governance constraints the management from their self-serving
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behavior and influences them to work in the interest of the
shareholders.
The theories put forward with respect to corporate
governance include the agency theory, stakeholder theory, and
stewardship theory. Among these, the agency theory is the most
influential.  It states that the managers pursue self-interested strategies
and will not act to maximize shareholders’ wealth unless an appropriate
governance structure is implemented to safeguard the latter’s interests
(Jensen andMeckling, 1976). Prior studies (Hartzelland Starks, 2003;
Cornett, Marcus, Saunders and Tehranian, 2007; Kamran and Shah,
2014) have found institutional ownership to be an effective corporate
governance mechanism. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argued that
institutional investors have greater stakes in the companies there
fore; they have the reasons and ability to monitor and influence the
decisions of the managers.
Earnings Quality
Earnings has always remained a very important input in the
decision making process of the investors and it is communicated to
the investors through the financial reports. The financial reports
translate the financial and operational performance of a company in
business language. After the major corporate scandals of Enron,
WorldCom and Tyco, the regulators placed more emphasis on the
corporate governance and the quality of financial reporting.  Earnings
quality is an important aspect of the financial reports’ reliability. It
refers to the quality of the reported earnings or the process of the
financial reporting. The financial reporting does not consist of only
financial information but it also includes other non-financial
information (SFAC, 1978).
External parties to corporations such as regulators, auditors
and tax authorities play an important and constructive role in the
monitoring of the earnings quality or the financial reports because
they represent most of the stakeholders. A sound financial reporting
system is an integral part of the corporate governance (Melis, 2000)
as it makes the managers accountable and thus, protects the interests
of the shareholders (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978).Butt and Shah (2009)
stated that financial reporting is practical and recognized system while
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the corporate governance is intellectual and theoretical. Financial
reporting system still has some issues and its foundation lies in dearth
of corporate governance system (Whittington, 1993). Researchers
(Beasley, 1996; Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1996) found that
weaknesses in governance have positive relationships with poor
financial reporting quality, earnings manipulation, financial statement
fraud, and weaker internal controls.
Institutional Ownership and the Quality of Earnings
Ownership structure has greater influence on a firm’s
governance structure and its performance (Moradi and Nezami, 2011).
Ownership is more or less dominant by the following: institutional
ownership, individual ownership, family ownership, block holdings
and directors’ ownerships. In Pakistan the listed companies are owned
by families, centralized ownership and institutional investor.
Institutional investors have larger stakes in the firms therefore, it is for
their own interest to keep an eye on the management and the
information shared by them. There are reasons for the institutional
investors to have access to the information. Financial reports are perfect
sources of reliable financial information. The most important thing
about the institutional investors is that they study financial reports
comprehensively as compared to other stockholders and infer
information (Hand, 1990).  Institutional investors not only rely on
financial information but also on non-financial information and evaluate
financial and non-financial information for their investment decisions.
Koh (2003) studied the association between the institutional
ownership and the quality of earnings. He used discretionary accruals
as a proxy of earnings quality. More use of discretionary accruals
deteriorates the quality of the reported information. The study found
negative association between the institutional ownership and
discretionary accruals that is with the increase in institutional
ownership the quality of reported earnings increases. Velury and
Jenkins (2006) studied the four dimensions of earnings quality, defined
in FASB, which are predictive value, timeliness, neutrality and
representational and evidenced that the existence of institutional
ownership improves the earnings quality and argued that the earnings
quality enjoys reliability. They found positive association between
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the institutional ownership and the quality of financial information.
Mirada (2008) and Moradzadeh Fard, Nezami, Mahdi and Farzani (2009)
found consistent results in the Iranian stock market.
Dong-Lin and Gang (2008) examined the role of institutional
ownership as a corporate governance mechanism on the earnings
quality. They examined three attributes of earnings: value relevance,
discretionary accruals and conservatism. The results of the study
showed positive association between the institutional ownership and
the quality of earnings. On further examination they found that a firm
with lesser or no institutional ownership had lower quality of reported
information. Kamran and Shah (2014) found negative association
between institutional ownership and discretionary accruals in
Pakistan. They argued that institutional investors use their power to
constrain managers from misrepresentation of financial information.
In the review of literature, we found majority studies on the
institutional ownership and the quality of earnings have their focus
on accruals quality. Studies on qualitative attributes of accounting
information mentioned in Statement of Financial Accounting Concept
NO. 2 (FASB, 1980) are very rare. In Pakistan we did not find any
study that has examined the association between institutional
ownership and qualitative characteristics of information, highlighted
in FASB (1980).In this study, qualitative dimensions are not selected
randomly rather this selection is standardized through relating it to
the conceptual framework of FASB. These dimensions are predictive
value (future operating cash flows), timeliness, neutrality and
representational faithfulness.
On the basis of the above discussion we draw the following
hypotheses for this study:
H01:There is no relationship between institutional ownership and
future operating cash flows.
HA1:There is relationship between institutional ownership and
future operating cash flows.
H02:There is no relationship between institutional ownership and
neutrality of information.
HA2:There is relationship between institutional ownership and
neutrality of information.
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H03:There is no relationship between institutional ownership and
timeliness.
HA3:There is relationship between institutional ownership and
timeliness.
H04:There is no relationship between institutional ownership and
representational faithfulness.
HA4:There is relationship between institutional ownership and
representational faithfulness.
Research Methodology
From among 581 companies listed on the Pakistan Stock
Exchange around 441 companies are non-financial companies.
Minimum criterion for any company to be included in the final sample
is the availability of at least 3 years complete data. Only 200 companies
were found to meet this criterion and are included in this study. The
span of the study is from the year 2002 to 2014. The data represents all
the non-financial sectors of the PSX. The data for this study is extracted
from the secondary source that is financial reports of the selected
companies. These reports were available on the respective company’s
website.
Following Velury and Jenkins (2006) four regression models,
one for each dimension (predictive value, neutrality, timeliness and
representational faithfulness), are used to test the hypotheses. The
following are the econometric models for each dimension.
Predictive Value or Feedback value (Future Operating Cash
flows)
Predictive value qualifies investors to study the earnings
and the cash flow relationship. Predictive value enables the information
users in correct forecasting i.e. predictive value and alsohelps users
to check prior expectation i.e. feedback value (SFAC No. 2). In the
equity valuation process accounting earnings are used to predict future
cash flows. For this purpose, current accounting results are used to
estimate future cash flows and predictive or feedback value reveals
that this estimation produces accurate results. Dechow (1994) found
strong evidence that earnings and future cash flows validate prior
earnings. A high predictive value of earnings indicates strong
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relationship between earnings and cash flows (Khajaviand Nazemi,
2005). In this model the association of interactive term of income
before extraordinary items and institutional ownership with the future
operating cash flows is examined.
CFOit+1 = á0 + á1 IBEO it + á2 IBEO it* SHBI it+ á3IBEOit * SHLI
it + á4 IBEO it * SHMN it+ á5GRTHit + á6 DEBT it + á7 LOSS it +å it
(Model 1)
Where,
CFOit+1 is dependent variable, IBEO*SHBI (the interactive
term of income before extraordinary items and institutional ownership)
is independent variable and SHLI (block Holdings), SHMN (managerial
shareholdings), GRTH (growth), DEBT (debt) and LOSS (loss) are
control Variables.
Neutrality
The information provided in financial statement must be
unbiased. The information must reflect balanced view of the firms’
activities rather than the favored ones. The financial system and its
internal control must be strong enough to control and manage the
deliberate or any systematic bias. Neutrality is the quality of reported
financial information to be without any bias or malfunction (SFAC No
02).
Prior studies have used abnormal accruals as a measure of
neutrality of financial information (Kamran and Shah, 2014; Latif and
Abdullah, 2015). Smaller abnormal accruals suggest more neutrality
and vice versa. Abnormal accruals are the difference between total
accruals and non-discretionary accruals. Total accruals (TA) are
calculated by subtracting the cash flow from operations (CFO) from
Net income (NI). It can be represented as: TAt= NIt- CFOt
For the calculation of the non-discretionary accruals we
estimated Jones (1991) and Modified Jones (1996) model.
Jones model for the estimation of non-discretionary accruals
is as follows:
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TA it /A it-1 = { á (1 / Ai t-1) + â1 (“REV it) /Ait-1)
+â2 (PPE it ) /Ait-1)} + å it
Eq. No. 01
Where;
TA is total accruals and “REV is change in revenue. Ait-1
represents previous year total assets, PPE it is plant, property and
equipment and åit is error term.
Modified Jones model was proposed by De chew, Sloan and
Sweeney in 1996. This model adjusts change in revenue with change
in receivables for the purpose to neutralize the effect when management
uses its discretion in revenues. Modified Jones model is as follows:
(TA i,t /A i,t-1)= { ái (1 / Ai t-1) + â1i (“REVi,t -”REV i,t)
/Ai,t-1) +â2 (PPE i,t ) /Ai,t-1) + å i,t
Eq. No 02
The estimated value of (TA i,t /A i,t-1) shows the non-
discretionary accruals. Abnormal accruals is calculated as the different
between  TA i,t /A i,t-1 and estimated TA i,t /A i,t-1. The choice of Jones or
modified Jones model for the calculation of accruals depends upon
the coefficient of determination (R2).
The relationship between neutrality (abnormal accruals) and
institutional ownership is examined through the following model:
ABNACit = á0 + á1 SHBI it + á2 SHLI it + á3SHMNit
+ á4TACCRit + á5 GRTH it + á6 DEBT it + á7 LOSS it+å it
(Model 2)
Where:
ABNAC (abnormal accruals) is dependent variable, SHBI
(institutional ownership) is independent variable and SHLI (block
holdings), SHMN (managerial shareholdings), TACCR (total accruals),
GRTH (growth), DEBT (debt) and LOSS (loss) are control variables.
Timeliness (the reporting lag)
Timeliness refers to the presentation of financial reports or
information in time to all users for their decision making needs. The
time of financial reporting is very important and any delay in reporting
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makes information irrelevant (SFAC No. 2) Timeliness is closely related
to the accounting principle of relevance. Consistent with the studies
of Khajavi and Nazemi (2005) and Brown, Dobbie and Jackson (2011)
the timeliness is measured as reporting lag. This reporting lag is
calculated as the number of days from the end of fiscal year to actual
earnings announcement date. The model is:
Repot-Lag it = á0 + á1 SHBI it + á2 SHLI it
+ á3SHMNit + á4 GRTH it + á5 DEBT it
+ á6LOSSit  +å it
(Model 3)
Where:
Repot-Lag is dependent variable and the SHBI is
independent variable. SHLI (block holdings), SHMN (managerial
shareholdings), GRTH (growth), DEBT (debt) and LOSS (loss) are
control variables.
Representational Faithfulness
Information provided in the financial statements should
faithfully represent the transaction and events that occur during a
period. Representational faithfulness is the correspondence or
agreement between measures or description and the phenomenon
that it purports to represent (SFAC No. 2). Changes in the economic
values of firms are measured or captured through earnings.
Representational faithfulness is examined through the association of
stock market prices and earning. Change in earnings over a period of
time causes change is prices of stocks (Beaver, 1989). The association
between institutional ownership and representational faithfulness is
examined through the following model.
RETit = á0 + á1 “ERN it + á2 “ERN it * SHBI it
+ á3 “ERN it * SHLI it + á4 “ERN it * SHMN it
+ á5GRTH it + á6 DEBT it + á7 LOSS it +å
(Model 4)
Where:
“ERN is change in earnings. RET (stock return) is dependent
variable and the interactive term “ERNit * SHBIit, is independent
variable. SHLI (Block Holdings), SHMN (managerial shareholdings),
GRTH (growth), DEBT (debt) and LOSS (loss) are control Variables.
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The data related to the ownership structure are taken from the
pattern of shareholdings provided in the annual reports of the
companies. It includes the percentage of equity owned by the managers
of the firms (SHMN), by block holders (SHLI) and by institutions
(SHBI). Growth (GRTH) is measured through market to book ratio. The
total debt (DEBT) is obtained from the financial statement of the firms.
Loss (LOSS) is used as dichotomous variable which is equal to 1 if the
firm reported a loss otherwise 0.
Results and Discussion
Table 1 presents the sample distribution by industry group.
The data represents companies from all the non-financial sectors of
the Pakistan Stock Exchange. Table below shows the distribution of
observations by industries.
Industry Group No of Observation 
Textile 155 
Cement 152 
Chemicals 138 
Food Producers 116 
Automobile and Parts 115 
General Industries 95 
Electricity 89 
Construction and 
Material 
86 
Oil and Gas 74 
Pharma and Biotech 72 
Engineering 64 
Electronic and Electrical 
goods 
46 
Industrial Transportation 44 
Household Goods 44 
Fixed line 
Telecommunication 
40 
Industrial Metals and 
Mining 
30 
Beverages 28 
Forestry 20 
Total 1408 
 
Table 1:
Distribution of Observations by Industry Group
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Descriptive statistics of the sample data are shown in Table
2. The cash flow from operations has the mean of 1,027,285 with
minimum value of -10,723,618 and maximum of 30,340,278. The Mean
of abnormal accruals is 0. The mean of abnormal accruals are required
to be zero or near to zero because in long run positive and negative
accruals compensate each other. The minimum value of abnormal
accruals is (0.63) and maximum is 14.36. The mean of total accruals is
369,515. The time variable (reporting lag) shows the average of 81
days with maximum 110 days and minimum of 65 days. These days’
difference shows the time lag between the end of fiscal year and
announcement of earnings. The mean values of institutional
ownership, managers’ shareholding and concentrated ownerships
are 23%, 18% and 49%respectively. The minimum values of these
three variables are 0. The average of income before extraordinary
items of sample data is 1,417,062.36.
  CFO(t+1)  ABNAC  TACCR   Time  Returns SHBI SHMN SHLI DEBT Growth IBEO 
            
Mean         1,027,285             0.00              369,515  
               
81            0.72         0.23            0.18            0.49            0.48            1.38          1,417,062.36  
Standard Error            131,820             0.02              113,350  
                   
0            0.87         0.01            0.01            0.01            0.01            0.11             181,613.83  
Median            167,187           (0.04)               (1,788) 
                
81         (0.41)        0.18            0.06            0.52            0.48            0.95             162,805.00  
Range      41,063,896           14.99        49,123,876  
                
45       618.62         0.97            0.98            0.98            0.99          76.65       70,348,703.00  
Minimum    (10,723,618)          (0.63)    (14,935,468) 
                
65       (35.04)             -                   -                   -                   -          (48.43)       (5,820,017.00) 
Maximum      30,340,278           14.36        34,188,408  
              
110       583.58         0.97            0.98            0.98            0.99          28.21       64,528,686.00  
Sum    718,071,889             0.00     258,291,277  
        
56,901       503.13    157.47        122.89        339.03        338.59        965.99     990,526,592.00  
 
Table 3 presents the correlation coefficients of all variables.
Institutional ownership, growth and income before extraordinary items
are positively related to the future cash flows from operation. Debts
and managerial shareholding are negatively related with future cash
flows from operations. Total accruals are positively related with
abnormal accruals. Institutional ownership and income before
extraordinary items have positive correlation with total accruals. Debts
are negatively correlated with total accruals. Institutional ownership
is negatively correlated with managerial shareholding and debts and
shows that the existence of institutional ownership limits the role of
manager and controls the total debts.
Table 2:
Descriptive Statistics
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Table 3
Correlation Matrix
 Managerial ownership is positively correlated with total debts while
the institutional ownership is negatively related with total debts.
Growth is positively correlated with income because higher growth
results in more income, cash flows and firm performance.
Results of Fixed Effect Regression of Institutional ownership on
Four Dimensions of Earning Quality
This study is based on panel data. The normality of the data
is checked and the outliers are first removed. Multicollinearity is
checked thorough VIF. Hausman test is estimated for the selection of
the best suited model for our data. Table 4 represents the regression
estimates. The proxies of earnings quality are predictive value,
neutrality, timeliness and representational faithfulness. The estimated
coefficients, p-value, t- statistic, f-test statistics and coefficient of
determination are shown in the table.
The Hausman test result was insignificant with Chi-Square
value of 138.61, therefore fixed effect model is estimated. Regression
results of the first model (predictive value or feedback value) show
significant and positive relationship between future operating cash
flows and interactive term of income before extra-ordinary items and
institutional ownership. This implies that with the institutional
ownership the predictive and feedback value of the future operating
cash flows increases or it can be explained as with the institutional
ownerships, earnings can be used as an input to predict the future
cash flows. This attribute of information has implications for the
 
  CFO(t+1) ABNAC TACCR 
Time 
(reporting) Returns 
 
SHBI 
 
SHMN 
 
SHLI 
 
DEBT 
 
Growth 
 
IBEO 
CFO(t+1) 1                     
ABNAC -0.0355 1                   
TACCR 0.0935 0.1569 1                 
Time  
(reporting 
lag) 0.0246 -0.0319 -0.0576 1               
Returns -0.0371 -0.0011 0.0234 0.0218 1             
SHBI 0.1519 0.0166 0.1938 0.0535 0.0144 1            
SHMN -0.1359 0.0080 -0.0963 0.0673 -0.0131 -0.2724 1         
SHLI 0.0579 0.0470 0.0716 -0.030 0.0136 -0.0847 -0.2113 1       
Debt  -0.2082 -0.0425 -0.1692 0.0267 0.0458 -0.1444 0.2290 
-
0.1920 1     
Growth 0.1450 0.0018 0.0498 0.0178 -0.0006 0.0893 -0.0678 0.0781 -0.2630 1   
IBEO 0.7813 0.0713 0.6887 -0 .0209 -0.0128 0.2319 -0.1620 0.0880 -0.2616 0 .1389 1 
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investors who can make their investment decisions on the basis of
correct estimation of the future cash flows. We accept our first
hypothesis that there is relationship between institutional ownership
and future operating cash flows. The coefficient of block holding is
negatively significant that indicates the decrease in predictability of
future operating cash flows with block shareholdings. The coefficient
of managerial shareholding is also negative but insignificant, which
implies that managerial shareholding has no contribution in the
prediction of future operating cash flows.  Loss is also negatively
associated with the future operating cash flow.
Table 04 :
Estimated Coefficient from Fixed Effect Regression of Institutional
Ownership on the Four Dimensions Quality (Predictive value,
Neutrality, Timeliness and Representational faithfulness)
  Predictive Value Neutrality of Earrings Timeliness Representational 
faithfulness 
  
S 
N o 
Independent 
 Variable 
Coeffic ient            P-Values Coefficien t      P-Values Coefficient               P-Values Coefficient               P-Values 
1 INCOME BEFORE           
EXTRA ORDINARY 
ITEMS 
6.838 0.94 
    0.08-t-value   
2 TOTAL ACCRUALS    0.001 0.7 
    0.38-t-value   
3 EARNINGS    0.0002 0.63 
    0.48-t-value 
  INSTITUT IONAL 1.0431 0.006 -0.0756 0.228 -2 .3469 0.034 0.34 0.056 
  SHAREHOLDING 
    4.1300***-t-value 1.21-t-value 1.7300**-t-value  1.8700*-t-value 
5 BLOCK HOLDING -5.5084 0.000 -0.0061 0.914 -2 .0637 0.465 1.41 0.037 
    3.7700*** t-value 0.11-t-value 1.73-t-value 2.6700** t-value 
6 MANAGERS 
SHAREHOLDING  
-1.1421 0.534 0.1537 0.079 1.0467 0.036 0.13 0.351 
    0.62-t-value 1.76 t-value 1.9100**t-value 0.93-t-value 
7 GROWTH 1.2934 0.524 0.104 0.000 0.0729 0.593 0.0065 0.089 
    0.64- t-value 12.0800*** t-va lue 0.54*** t-value 1.7800*** t-value 
8 TOTAL DEBTS 4.1648 0.201 0.0428 0.262 0.656 0.692 0.3632 0.005 
    1.28-t-value 1.12-t-value 0.40-t-value 2.8200*** t-value 
9 LOSS 8.9297 0.078 0.0735 0.000 0.6926 0.745 0.1344 0.025 
    1.1700* -t-value 4.2700*** - t-value 0.32-t-value 2.2500**- t-value 
10 CONSTANT 2.5318 0.18 -0.0217 0.607 79.987 0.000 0.1771 0.000 
    1.34-t-value 0.51-t-value 33.9600*** t-va lue 2.7100*** t-value 
11 PROB>F 4.52   25.91   4.91   3.15   
    0.0001*** -p-value 0.0000*** p-value 0.0001*** -p -value 0.0028*** -p-value 
12 R2 0.2231   0.3024   0.215   0.2006   
***significant at 1 % level;  ** significant at 5 % level; and * signif icant at  10 % level. 
          
 
For second model, Chi-Square value of the Hausman test
was 86.15, therefore we estimated the fixed effect regression model.
Regression results of second model (neutrality) depict that the
institutional ownership is not associated with abnormal accruals. The
coefficient is negative but insignificant. We do not accept second
hypothesis which states that there is a relationship between
institutional ownership and accruals. The coefficient of managerial
shareholding is negatively significant which implies that with
managerial shareholding use of discretionary accrual minimizes. The
coefficient of growth is positively significant that is the growing
firms have a tendency to use more discretionary accruals. The
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For third model, Chi-Square value of the Hausman test was
13.38, therefore we estimated the fixed effect regression model. The
regression results of third model (timeliness)depict that the coefficient
of institutional ownership is negatively significant. This shows that
the reporting lag decreases with the institutional ownership. This is
one of the important qualitative attributes of information. According
to FASB (1980) the information losses its importance when it is delayed
or when it cannot be used as an input in decision making process. Our
results show that institutional ownership increases the usefulness of
financial information by minimizing the reporting lag. We accept our
third hypothesis that there is relationship between institutional
ownership and timeliness. The coefficient of block holding is also
negative but it is positive for managerial shareholding. It shows that
the presence of institutional ownership and block holders improve the
reporting lag and information is available on time to the stakeholders.
For the fourth model, Hausman test result was insignificant
with chi-square value of 28.80. The regression results of the fourth
model (representational faithfulness) show that institutional ownership
is positively related with the representational faithfulness. This implies
that with institutional owner ship the agreement or correspondence
between earnings and stock returns increase. Change in earnings over
a period of time causes change is prices of stocks.  We accept our
fourth hypothesis that there is relationship between institutional
ownership and representational faithfulness. The coefficient of block
holding is also positively significant while that of managerial
shareholding is insignificant. The coefficient of growth is positively
related with the returns.
In three of our four models we found the influence of
institutional ownership on the quality of reported earnings. With the
presence of institutional investors, future operating cash flows can
be accurately predicted through current year earnings. Also with
institutional ownership the reporting lag of information announcement
reduces and the correspondence between earnings and returns
increases.
coefficient of loss is negatively significant that is in year of loss there
is less use of discretionary accruals.
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Robustness Checks
To check the robustness of our findings that whether
institutional shareholding brings more oversight or increases the
earnings quality and to make comparable the earnings quality at
different levels of institutional shareholding we further analyzed the
data. For this purpose we divided the data into two equal parts, using
the median value of institutional shareholding. The first part of data
(labeled as 1) contains observations having institutional shareholding
value from minimum to median value and the second part of data
(labeled as 2) contains observations having institutional shareholding
value from median to maximum value. Table 5 shows the results of
fixed effect regression models of institutional ownership on four
dimensions of earnings quality. Column 1 shows results of first part
of data set that has lower institutional ownership value and column 2
shows results of second part of data with higher institutional
ownership values.
Table 05
Estimated Coefficient from Fixed Effect Regression of Institutional
Ownership on the Four Dimensions Quality (On data distributed
equally in two sets on the basis of institutional ownership) P-values
Italized
  Predictive Value Neutrality of Earrings Timeliness Representational 
faithfulness 
  
    1 2 1 2 1 2 1 
S No Independent 
 Variable 
Coefficient       Coefficient      Coefficient      Coefficient      Coefficient      Coefficient      Coefficient       Coefficient      
1 INCOME BEFORE 
EXTRA ORDINARY 
ITEMS 
5.6940 7.6580             
  0.7540 0.005***             
2 TOTAL ACCRUALS      -0.0039 0.0023         
        0.061* 0.000***         
3 EARNINGS              0.0001 0.0003
                0.6920 0.3520
4 INSTITUTIONAL 
SHAREHOLDING 
0.9486 2.2047 -2.5058 -0.1204 -0.8180 1.6840 0.0867 0.2510
    0.7690 0.005*** 0.1160 0.023** 0.9040 0.065* 0.059* 0.045**
5 BLOCK HOLDING 4.5102 1.4493 0.2051 0.0244 -2.2480 6.1430 0.0171 0.0856
    0.0038** 0.056* 0.7550 0.7520 0.079* 0.1140 0.092* 0.9250
6 MANAGERS 
SHAREHOLDING  
3.1489 -1.0241 -1.3740 -0.1835 5.2300 4.362 -0.0458 0.0150
    0.5960 0.067* 0.025** 0.2240 0.051* 0.091* 0.5950 0.4020
7 GROWTH 1.4582 2.4591 -0.0237 0.0550 0.1380 -0.1350 0.0388 0.0083
    0.079* 0.2470 0.7190 0.036** 0.8250 0.3410 0.045** 0.048**
8 TOTAL DEBTS 1.7970 0.9743 0.8740 0.0442 -0.2974 0.7401 0.7352 -0.3963
    0.011** 0.5720 0.019** 0.4160 0.039** 0.8010 0.013** 0.1120
9 LOSS -5.0419 -2.4215 -0.2181 -0.1029 1.3170 1.4361 0.0765 -0.0001
    0.033** 0.035** 0.018** 0.000*** 0.3920 0.092* 0.057* 0.882
10 CONSTANT 3.4598 4.5480 0.0517 -0.0501 77.3940 84.3380 0.4009 0.2477
    0.1180 0.3570 0.5620 0.4210 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.026** 0.046**
11 PROB>F 5.6400 4.5700 2.5700 10.34 5.2300 4.4000 3.5600 2.7800
    0.000*** 0.000*** 0.0139** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002***
12 R2 0.2330 0.3420 0.2230 0.4360 0.1250 0.2020 0.2430 0.1678
***significant at 1 % level; ** significant at 5 % level; and * significant at 10 % level. 
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It can be seen in table 5 that in column 1 of the predictive
value, the coefficient of institutional shareholding is positive but
insignificant while in column 2 the coefficient is significant at 1percent
level of significance. It depicts that greater the level of institutional
shareholding greater would be the predictive value or the presence of
greater institutional shareholding helps investors to correctly forecast
the future operating cash flows of a firm. In full data regression (table
4) it can be seen that institutional ownership was not related with
neutrality of earnings. But for split data (table 5)the coefficient of
institutional shareholding in column 2 is negatively significant. It
shows that increase in institutional shareholding increases the
oversight and reduces biasness in reported earnings. This result is in
consistent with the findings of Koh (2003) and Kamran and Shah
(2014). For timeliness, the coefficient of institutional shareholding is
insignificant in column 1 but is significant in column 2 at 10 percent
level of significance. This affirms that more the shareholding of
institutions, timely would be the availability of information to the
investors. It can also be seen that in column 1 the coefficient of block
holding is negatively significant and in column 2 the coefficient of
managers’ shareholding is positively significant. It upholds that
presence of block holdings also reduces the reporting lag while
presence of managers’ shareholding increases the reporting lag. For
representational faithfulness the coefficients of institutional
shareholding in both column 1 and 2 are significant. The magnitude
of coefficient in column 2 is greater than column 1 also it is significant
at 5 percent level of significance.
The results of table 5 showed that the presence of intuitional
shareholding influences the managerial decisions and is an importance
corporate governance mechanism. The comparison of different levels
of institutional shareholding showed that greater level of institutional
shareholding brings more oversight and increases quality of reported
earnings.
Conclusion
The monitoring role of institutional ownership is related with
firms’ corporate governance, performance, earnings management, and
reporting quality. The earnings quality is an important area that has
been examined in previous studies through the use of discretionary
accruals. But the qualitative attributes of information highlighted in
SFAC NO. 2 have been rarely discussed and empirically examined.
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In this study the role of institutional ownership with respect
to earnings quality is empirically tested. The earnings quality is a
broader area and has many dimensions. For this study we have utilized
the conceptual framework of Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB, 1980) in the selection of dimensions of earnings quality. These
quality dimensions are predictive value or feedback value, neutrality,
timeliness and representational faithfulness.
Overall results showed that institutional ownership is
positively associated with the quality of reported earnings. Moreover,
the greater the level of institutional shareholding the greater would
be the quality of reported earnings.  It has important implications for
every stakeholder. The corporate governance and ownership structure
is very important for the growth of corporate sector in Pakistan. Further
studies can explore the relations between other governance
mechanisms and quality dimensions of earnings such as earnings
smoothness, earnings variability, earnings persistence.
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